Ahora, por primera vez en vida, acabas de descubrir para qué te pusieron sobre la faz de la tierra; acabas de darte cuenta de que tu vida tiene un sentido, acabas de encontrar algo por lo que luchar y la oportunidad de hacer algo grande, algo que verdaderamente merezca la pena, algo que te procure la gloria y la inmortalidad; ahora tienes una oportunidad que se presenta pocas veces en la vida y a pocos hombres en la historia: puedes llegar a saber quién eres al mismo tiempo que descubres el sentido de la historia, puedes tomar la medida de ti mismo, ir en pos de tu destino y encontrarte contigo al final de él, ahora tienes una causa (final, pero no por ello menos eficiente) por la que combatir, una meta a la cual subordinar todos tus actos; incluso aunque fracases, intentarlo habrá merecido la pena, habrás vivido una vida despierta, en lugar del duermevela en el cual sobreviven los hombres corrientes y sin relieve; y, si triunfas, habrás esculpido en oro tu nombre en el panteón del tiempo, habrás cumplido la promesa que hoy te haces sólo ante ti mismo.

Nietzsche - "El nacimiento de la tragedia"

Nietzsche incontra Breuer e, assieme, avviano quella che potrebbe essere considerata la prima serie di sedute di psicanalisi. Il romanzo, partendo da un presupposto falso, ovvero l'incontro fra questi due soggetti, mai avvenuto nella realtà, è in grado di far emozionare il lettore guidandolo attraverso le tematiche fondamentali dell'animo umano, che ossessionano ciascuno di noi.

Il tutto inizia quando una sfrontata Lou Salomè, in preda alla preoccupazione per salute del suo amico Nietzsche, è spinta a richiedere a Breuer, uno stimato medico della Vienna di fine ottocento, una cura per il filosofo. Un'azione che la vera Lou Salomè, ben poco predisposta ad ammettere i propri sbagli o provare pena per Nietzsche, non avrebbe mai fatto. Breuer decide di accettare la proposta, che si rivelerà molto difficile da mettere in atto per un semplice motivo: l'orgoglio che Nietzsche prova per sè stesso, la sua incapacità a voler ammettere esplicitamente di aver bisogno di aiuto, la sua volontà di non sottomettersi a nessun altro. Motivi per colpa dei quali, Breuer, sarà costretto a mentire e a non menzionare mai la visità della ragazza. Sarà molto difficile avvicinarsi a Nietzsche e cercare di curarlo senza che lui se ne accorga, senza che in qualche modo senta sottomessa la sua potenza.

Sarà proprio in questo clima che Bruer proporrà a Nietzsche, per evitare di perderlo, di fare entrambi da pazienti e da medici: Bruer curerà al filosofo le continue emicranie e i permanenti dolori fisici mentre quest ultimo cercherà di guarire i mali interiori, legati al pensiero e all'animo, che Breuer da un po' di tempo prova. Grazie a questo accordo i due si incontreranno una volta al giorno e avranno lungo tempo per discutere fra loro, lungo tempo per intraprendere, in uno stato primordiale, una prima cura di psicanalisi. Si avvierà dunque un dibattito serrato, in cui Nietzsche metterà in chiaro le sue idee e le sue posizioni irremovibili e cercherà di guarire il medico dal male attraverso la propria filosofia.

Ed è proprio grazie a questi continui dibattiti, a queste conversazioni, a questi interrogatori che Irivin D. Yalom riesce a catturare l'attenzione del lettore. Presentando la filosofia di Nietzsche in modo chiaro e accattivante, rendendola masticabile e comprensibile ad una prima lettura. Rendendo evidenti al lettore i sentimenti repressi del filosofo, che da troppo tempo cerca di nascondere la propria paura, tristezza o solitudine per evitare di apparire umano, troppo umano.

Un dibattito che non mancherà di affascinare l'ascoltatore. Un dibattito che si prolungherà per le oltre quattrocento pagine del libro ma che, nonostante questo, non apparirà mai pesante. Un dibattito grazie a cui Breuer uscirà rinnovato, finalmente curato dai propri mali e alla fine del quale Nietzsche, oramai esausto e non più in grado di tenere i suoi pensieri all'interno del suo corpo, rivelerà tutto. In un momento in cui Breuer oramai aveva perso ogni speranza e si era definitivamente rassegnato ad essere lui il paziente e Nietzsche il medico, il filosofo irromperà in un pianto e, inaspettatamente, riverserà all'esterno i pensieri e le sofferenze che lo tormentano, il disperato bisogno di un amico vero; in altre parole tutte quei sentimenti che, per via della sua filosofia, aveva tenuto nascosti anche a sè stesso.

Nietzsche kritiserer i Hinsides godt og ondt (jf. § 17) den logiske forestilling, der knytter sig til subjektet, hvis aktivitet beskrives gennem prædikatet. Vi er blevet så vante til at tænke, siger han, at jeg er betingelsen for dette at tænke og han knytter det sammen med en kritik af den fri vilje. Når vi siger, jeg tænker, så implicerer det, at jeg handler i overensstemmelse med min vilje, at jeg så at sige udfører en villet handling. Enhver, der har arbejdet med yoga og meditation, eller stadig gør det, ved hvor uholdbart dette er. Tankerne er ikke afhængige af vores bevidste jeg, vore grammatiske jeg. Jeg er, i allervideste forstand, ikke herre i eget hus og spørgsmålet er om der overhovedet er et sådant jeghus? Grammatikken definerer ikke en egenskab ved virkeligheden, men definerer ud fra konsensus, en særlig praksis defineret som sprog. Det er denne spaltning mellem sprog og virkelighed, Nietzsche har fat i. Det er altså ikke jeg, som tænker, men noget andet, dog er vi lige så dårligt stillet, hvis vi, som Nietzsche, forsøger os med et det tænker. Ganske vist er det ikke bare et andet ord for jeg, prøv engang bare at tænke implikationerne ved en udskiftning mellem det og jeg nogenlunde til ende. Hvad om vi udskiftede det lyriske jeg med et lyrisk det? Det er noget jeget fremmed. Det er noget fremmed og forskelligt fra jeg og er primært i forhold til jeg og dog ligger der allerede i dette det al for meget udlægning, al for meget fortolkning. Det tænker er ifølge Nietzsche allerede forskudt fra dette tænkende (men også sidstkursiverede er allerede fortolket eller i det mindste kalder det på en fortolkning inden for de grammatiske rammer, vores sprog tilbyder os), det er allerede blevet en del af den grammatisk funderede vestlige metafysik, idet det beskriver en aktivitet, der udføres af nogen eller noget – det står ikke bare i sidst allermest nøgne at. Hos Nietzsches er der med andre ord en absolut fremmedhed på spil i det absolutte skel mellem virkelighed og sprog, som Nietzsche selv selvfølgelig indfanges i (og det er der (i parentes nævnt), at det perspektiviske hos Nietzsche fødes).

Men lad os fastholde det øjensynligt flygtende jeg. Kun øjensynligt, for det er ikke andet end jegets forædling, hvilken definerer en parallellitet og en forskel i sproget. Man kan forestille sig muligheden af for et øjeblik at kunne arbejde ud fra det gamle græske sandhedsbegreb eteos, hvor sproget afbilder verden i forholdet 1:1. Det benævner da det fremmede, det ukendte, dette noget, som netop ikke kan benævnes, men som må afdækkes i sin negativitet. Hvis dette det tænker, sådan må vi også forstå Nietzsche, så tænkes jeg. Det tænker og først da opstår jeget. Skal vi indgå den aftale, at vi nu har etableret et det, der i sin definitive negativitet lader sig omtale positivt? Alt hvad vi omtaler og værner om som jeg, bevidsthed, selvindsigt, viden, forelskelse, alt det opstår ud af detets dyb; ikke som et apperceptivt spil og da slet ikke som en bekræftelse af jeget, men derimod som en destruktion af jegbevidstheden. Er det ikke netop i den forstand, at vi må fastholde, at jeg altid i det mindste er fremmed for sin normalbetydning?

Hos den franske psykoanalytiker Lacan danner jeget sig i en spejling af verden og ikke bare i en udviklingspsykologisk forstand, men som en synkron orden i det psykiske apparat. I den udviklingsteoretiske fase af spejlstadiet er der tale om, at barnet forholdsvist tidligt (mellem 6 og 18 måneder gammelt) skaber en enhed mellem det psykiske jeg og kropsjeget gennem en processuel optagelse af det fremmede billede i form af et jævnaldrende barn eller som faktisk spejlbillede af barnet selv som et billede af mig selv. Først da opstår jeget, men dermed struktureres også jeget gennem en andethed. ”Ethvert subjekt har således en ureducerbar kerne af andethed, der paradoksalt nok muliggør subjektet selv.”(2). Det er præcis denne ureducerbare kerne, Nietzsche arbejder med i det ovenstående.

Den lacanianske model for det psykiske ser kort fortalt ud på følgende måde. Den symbolske orden betegner det vi med et ikke helt rammende ord kan beskrive som det sociale, dvs. en orden, der består i enheden af sprog, kommunikation, intersubjektive relationer og indoptagelsen af Loven eller den Store Anden. Det vil altså sige, at det symbolske eller det sociale er struktureret ud fra det Freud betegnede som overjeget, men hos Lacan er den Store Anden ikke bare et passivt reservoir, men gør derimod hele tiden sin indvirkning gældende i jeget. Sammenfiltret med det symbolske er imidlertid det imaginære, der er nært forbundet med spejlingen, dvs. at vores symbolske tilstedeværelse i verden er forbundet med jegidealer og fantasier og drømme i det hele taget, men det betyder også, at jegdannelsens andethed, igennem det imaginære, hele tiden gør sig gældende i jeget ved hjælp af det symbolske. Dermed bliver vores gøren og laden hele tiden defineret ud fra en mangel, som vi forsøger at eliminere gennem afsøgninger i det symbolske. Den mangel er kendetegnet ved det Reelle, som et førsprogligt aspekt ved jeget og det forsøger hele tiden at komme til udtryk gennem de sproglige repræsentationer i den symbolske orden, men i og med det er førsprogligt vil dette aldrig lykkes, hvorfor her kun kan være tale om en grundlæggende mangel i det symbolske. ”Det er netop som det, der mangler i det symbolske, at det reelle viser sig.”(3). Det bringer os frem til objet petit a (objekt lille a), som betegner sammenhængen mellem det Reelle og begæret i form af den begærede genstand, hvilket blot vil sige, at vores begær altid vil være utilfredsstillet, idet det kun kan komme til udtryk gennem det symbolske. Når vi begærer et objekt er det således i virkeligheden det Reelle, som vi ikke kan opnå, vi begærer, dermed synes det psykiske hos Lacan at være defineret ved en grundlæggende mangel; jeget er således struktureret ud fra en fundamental andethed og vores begær er utilfredstilleligt fordi det hele tiden må forløbe inden for det symbolske.

Jeget og sproget driver en afstand ind mellem bevidsthed og det Reelle, men lige så sandt er det, at bevidstheden ikke er andet end denne afstands uoverskridelige udtryk. Navigerer selvbevidstheden ikke i gabet mellem det Reelle og jeget, således at vi kan bestemme os for, skabe konsensus omkring, i det mindste for et øjeblik, at kunne tale eteotisk om det fremmede i begreber som f.eks. det Reelle og jeg? Ifølge Lacan kommer vi aldrig udenom det symbolske og det giver Nietzsche ham ret i – Nietzsche indleder jo da selv med at skrive jeg i en ironisk gestus over sin egen kritik.

”Hvorfor har vi beholdt vores navne?” skriver Deleuze og Guattari, ”Af vane, ene og alene af vane. For at gøre os selv uigenkendelige. For at skjule – ikke os selv, men det som får os til at handle, føle eller tænke. Og desuden fordi det er rart at tale som alle andre og sige solen står op selvom alle ved at det bare er en talemåde. Ikke for at nå frem til hvor man ikke længere siger jeg, men for at nå frem til det punkt hvor det ikke længere er vigtigt om man siger jeg eller ej.” (4)

Hvorfor, tænker vi, er det nødvendigt at skjule det, som allerede er skjult? Umiddelbart efter drager de en analogi mellem jeget i form af egenavnet og dette, at solen står op. Dermed er jeg defineret i al dets almindelige fremmedhed for sin egen normalbetydning. Zizek gør i Det skrøbelige absolutte ganske rigtigt opmærksom på, at det kun giver mening at lege skjul, hvis der er nogen, der ønsker at finde en. Gør D&G da ikke allerede på første side, under overskriften ”Indledning: rhizom”, opmærksom på deres eget begær: at finde ”det som får os til at handle, føle eller tænke”? Hvis de virkelig ønskede at skjule dette det, hvorfor så overhovedet bringe det frem i lyset, hvor alle kan se det? Eller sagt på en anden måde, i og med de nævner det skjuler de det jo også, fordi det i det symbolske kun kan komme til udtryk som objet petit a og dermed skjuler de paradoksalt nok lige præcis det, som de har fundet, idet de hævdede at have skjult det; sådan formår de faktisk at gøre det, de hævder at gøre. Betegner egenavnet ikke lige præcis stedet, hvor det mest adækvat kan komme til udtryk? Altså tilbage ved Husserl: ”Læser vi ordet 'jeg' uden at vide, hvem der har skrevet det, så har vi et ord, som er, om ikke betydningsløst, så i de mindste fremmed for sin normalbetydning.” Netop i dets fremmedhed får vi mulighed for at få fat i det, der skjuler sig bag jeg. Vi finder det, fordi vi skjuler det. Dermed strukturerer vores søgen sig i forhold til det, vi søger, hvorfor vi virkelig kan fastholde, at vi ikke søger, men finder – og i forlængelse heraf ligger, at ethvert fund er et skuffet begær.

Noter
(1) Her citeret efter Jacques Derrida Stemmen og fænomenet, København 1997, s. 31.
(2) Adam Didrichsen ”Lacan: strukturalistisk psykoanalyse” in Poul Lübcke (red.) Fransk filosofi – Engagement og struktur, København 2003, s. 210.
(3) Ibid. s. 215.
(4) Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari Tusind plateauer, København 2005, s. 5.

I think it's a great idea to make our discussion public. That's why I'm posting this my (embarrasingly late) reply here:

Hey Mike. Thanks for giving my suggestion serious consideration. I'm sorry it has taken me this long to reply. I've tried several times to compose a text, but found it very hard to do properly. I now see that my attempts failed because I was trying to dig into too many issues at once. This time, I'll try to keep the focus on the central issue you bring up, about compositeness.

The number analogy was a bit confusing at first, as mathematical and empirical objects are understood by both Kant and myself as belonging to completely separate realms (in Kant's terminology, a priori and a posteriori). I think I understand what you're saying though, at least when you relate the analogy to things (like the table). But you're wrong about Kant's position:

First of all, Kant didn't see numbers as "out there" in the empirical world, whether composite or singular ones. He did view mathematics as objective, but not in the sense of being external, only in the sense that it is true regardless of which subject is engaged in mathematical thought.

Secondly, things-in-themselves are not viewed by Kant as having definite properties like for instance spatial extension or causal relations to other objects. Properties such as these are supplied not by objects but by our cognitive apparatus when we're viewing objects. The particular ones I mentioned are "transcendental concepts", the full set of which I think could be called "the necessary and constitutive optic of experience", by which I mean that experience would be impossible (or at least unintelligible) if the transcendental concepts (extension, duration, causality etc) hadn't been applied. The application of transcendental concepts is a minimal requirement for cognition, and are thus present in all functioning humans. This is the ground for Kant's peculiar form of "physical objectivity", where the objectivity in question is similar to mathematical objectivity in that it contains no claim about external reality.

Kant would probably sympathize strongly with the view you attribute to him, that things-in-themselves are composite entities, but his own system prohibits him from any positive claims about noumena at all. The concept of noumenal reality is in fact defined as radical negation, as a resounding "I don't know" to the question of what is the source of empirical appearances. To Kant, the answer to this lies beyond our cognitive limits, and we have no choice but to be agnostic about it. The only thing we can obtain certain knowledge about is the rules of cognition (math and the transcendental concepts).

You claim that "independent of our experiences, there are only prime entities". I sympathize with this view, but just like with Kant and his opposing (hypothetical) preferences above, I too have to suspend judgment, because the claim is a metaphysical one. Strictly speaking, agnosticism is the only viable position here. (But of course, there is no reason one has to be this strict all the time! I'll come back to this important point and elaborate in a later post here on my blog.)

"Green and hairy" is to Kant not a priori categories. A green and hairy experience is to Kant just a confused one. If the confusion is overcome, the experience becomes clear and distinct, but not because one has connected somehow to the noumenal realm, not at all. Clarity or purity of thought is merely an internal matter of mental discipline, not about taking part in noumenal reality. 

To your last point, the one with the painting analogy: I wholeheartedly agree, and I think this is a profound and very important issue. Not that I think it would change the course of scientific research a whole lot -- because science needs communicable results to progress, and must therefore limit itself to what's quantifiable (in other words, it is necessarily materialist, at least methodologically so) -- but it certainly would be very valuable for scientists to frame the problem in the way you describe. I think their theoretical intuition would benefit. But the most important consequences of "physical subjectivism" is for philosophy. I see it as an intellectually fertile new "platform of the age", much like how Kant's system was in the 19th century, but in an improved, modern skin, complete with clear language and the possibility of direct connection to frontier sciences (in particular neuroscience and computer science). I think you've done a wonderful job explaining the basics of the theory, particularly in the first two videos of your Emergence series (for those of you who don't know what I'm talking about, see my previous post). I'd love to see more videos from you on the subject. And I'd like to make a serious contribution of my own. This fall, I started on a master's program in philosophy, and hope to be writing my master's thesis on "virtualism" (as you know I prefer to call it). I won't be starting on that until next fall, but it is, of course, constantly present in the back of my head. And any discussion that relates to it is much appreciated.

One last remark, about Kant: I've been having second thoughts about him lately, because of a class I'm taking where we're reading the Critique of Judgment. I now think his whole "critical approach" is flawed, in that the posited transcendentals are given a status that is far too high. They should not be priviledged and set apart from other concepts (like table-ness or redness or personality etc). The so-called transcendentals are elevated above the rest of our perspectival capabilities only (it seems to me) in virtue of their quantifiability. And this is a rather arbitrary attribute, as can be demonstrated by how technology conquers new ground in what can be quantified, e.g. in neuroscience.

Instead, I now think Nietzsche is the closest to both our positions. I recently read an excellent unpublished essay by him called "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense" that I think is very opportune for me to recommend in this context. It's not very long, and can be found in its entirety online, here.

I'm curious of what you think of Nietzsche. How familiar are you with him, and how close do you think your position is to his?

http://rapidshare.com/files/152779152/ecco_homo.rar.html

şifre: thejesterfromleicester.wordpress.com

(Die fröhliche Wissenschaft = DFW; A = Der Antichrist; ASZ = Also sprach Zarathustra; EH = Ecce Homo; M = Morgenröthe; G-D = Götzen-Dämmerung; JSGUB = Jenseits von Gut und Böse; WZM = Die Wille zur Macht)

By doing we forego.— At bottom I abhor all those moralities which say: "Do not do this! Renounce! Overcome yourself!"—I am well disposed toward those moralities which goad me to so something and do it again, from morning till evening, and then to dream of it at night, and to think of nothing except doing this well, as well as I alone can do it! Whoever lives like that, one thing after another that simply does not belong to such a life drops off: without hatred or aversion he sees this take its leave today and that tomorrow, like yellow leaves that any slight stirring of the air takes off a tree; or he may not even notice that it takes its leave, for his eye is riveted to its goal, and forward, not sideward, backward, downward. "What we do should determine what we forego"—that is how I like it, that is my placitum. But I do not wish to strive with open eyes for my own impoverishment, I do not like negative virtues,—virtues whose very essence it is to negate and deny oneself something.

(DFW,$304)

I teach you the Übermensch. Man is something that shall be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? All beings so far have created something beyond themselves; and do you want to be the ebb of this great flood and even go back to the beasts rather than overcome man? What is the ape to man? A laughingstock or a painful embarrassment. And man shall be just that for the Übermensch: a laughingstock or a painful embarrassment..."

(ASZ)

Whatever a theologian regards as true must be false: there you have almost a criterion of truth. His profound instinct of self-preservation stands against truth ever coming into honour in any way, or even getting stated. Wherever the influence of theologians is felt there is a transvaluation of values, and the concepts "true" and "false" are forced to change places: whatever is most damaging to life is there called "true," and whatever exalts it, intensifies it, approves it, justifies it and makes it triumphant is there called false.

(DA)

Whoever sought for signs of an ironical divinity's hand in the great drama of existence would find no small indication thereof in the stupendous question-mark that is called Christianity. That mankind should be on its knees before the very antithesis of what was the origin, the meaning and the law of the Gospels--that in the concept of the "church" the very things should be pronounced holy that the "bearer of glad tidings" regards as beneath him and behind him--it would be impossible to surpass this as a grand example of world-historical irony.

(DA)

It was the fate of Christianity that its faith had to become as sickly, as low and as

vulgar as the needs were sickly, low and vulgar to which it had to administer.

(DA)

Must I add that, in the whole New Testament, there appears but a solitary figure worthy of honour? Pilate, the Roman viceroy. To regard a Jewish imbroglio seriously--that was quite beyond him.

(DA)

After coming into contact with a religious man I always feel I must wash my hands.

(EH)

A casual stroll through the lunatic asylum shows that faith does not prove anything.

(DA)

Truthfulness.— I favor any skepsis to which I may reply: "Let us try it!" But I no longer wish to hear anything of all those things and questions that do not permit any experiment. This is the limit of my "truthfulness": for there courage has lost its right.

(DFW, $51)

New struggles.— After Buddha was dead, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave—a tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown.— And we—we still have to vanquish his shadow, too!

(DFW, $108)

The greatest advantage of polytheism.— For an individual to posit his own ideal and to derive from it his own law, joys, and rights—that may well have been considered hitherto as the most outrageous human aberration and as idolatry itself; the few who dared as much always felt the need to apologize to themselves, usually by saying: "Not I! Not I! But a god through me!" The wonderful art and gift of creating gods—polytheism—was the medium through which this impulse could discharge, purifiy, perfect, and ennoble itself: for originally it was a very undistinguished impulse, related to stubbornness, disobedience and envy.

(DFW,$143)

Being profound and seeming profound.— Those who know that they are profound strive for clarity; those who would like to seem profound to the crowd strive for obscurity. For the crowd believes that if it cannot see to the bottom of something it must be profound: it is so timid and dislikes going into the water.

(DFW,$173)

What makes one heroic?— Going out to meet at the same time one's highest suffering and one's highest hope.

(DFW,$268)

I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things:—then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love from henceforth! I do not want to wage war against what is ugly. I do not want to accuse, I do not even want to accuse those who accuse. Looking away shall be my only negation! And all in all and on the whole: some day I wish to be only a Yes-sayer!

(DFW,$276)

Taking seriously.— In the great majority, the intellect is a clumsy, gloomy, creaking machine that is difficult to start: they call it "taking the matter seriously" when they want to work with this machine and think well—oh how burdensome they must find good thinking! The lovely human beast always seems to lose its good spirits when it thinks well; it becomes "serious"! And "where laughter and gaiety are found, thinking does not amount to anything":—that is the prejudice of this serious beast against all "gay science."— Well then, let us prove that this is a prejudice!

(DFW,$327)

As interpreters of our experience.— One sort of honesty has been alien to all founders of religions and their kind:—they have never made their experiences a matter of conscience for knowledge. "What did I really experience? What happened to me and around me at that time? Was my reason bright enough? Was my will opposed to all deceptions of the senses and bold in resisting the fantastic?"—none of them has asked such questions, nor do any of our dear religious people ask them even now; on the contrary, they thirst after things that go against reason, and they do not wish to make it too hard for themselves to satisfy it,—so they experience "miracles" and "rebirths" and hear the voices of little angels! But we, we others who thirst after reason, are determined to scrutinize our experiences as severely as a scientific experiment, hour after hour, day after day! We ourselves wish to be our experiments and guinea pigs.

(DFW,$319)

In media vita — No, life has not disappointed me! On the contrary, I find it truer, more desirable and mysterious every year,—ever since the day when the great liberator came to me, the idea that life could be an experiment of the seeker for knowledge—and not a duty, not a calamity, not a trickery!— And knowledge itself: let it be something else for others, for example, a bed to rest on, or the way to such a bed, or a diversion, or a form of leisure,—for me it is a world of dangers and victories in which heroic feelings, too, find places to dance and play. "Life as a means to knowledge"—with this principle in one's heart one can live not only boldly but even gaily and laugh gaily, too! And who knows how to laugh anyway and live well if he does not first know a good deal about war and victory?

(DFW,$324)

The surest way to corrupt a youth is to instruct him to hold in higher esteem those who think alike than those who think differently.

(M)

The Christian resolution to find the world ugly and bad has made the world ugly and bad.

(DFW,$130)

What is now decisive against Christianity is our taste, no longer our reasons.

(DFW,$132)

You great star, what would your happiness be had you not those for whom you shine?

(ASZ)

Verily, a polluted stream is man. One must be a sea to be able to receive a polluted stream without becoming unclean.

(ASZ)

Who is the great dragon whom the spirit will no longer call lord and god? "Thou shalt" is the name of the great dragon. But the spirit of the lion says, "I will." "Thou shalt" lies in his way, sparkling like gold, an animal covered with scales; and on every scale shines a golden "thou shalt." Values, thousands of years old, shine on these scales; and thus speaks the mightiest of all the dragons: "All value of all things shines on me. All value has long been created, and I am all created value. Verily, there shall be no more 'I will.'" Thus speaks the dragon.

(ASZ)

Whence come the highest mountains? I once asked. Then I learned that they came out of the sea. The evidence is written in their rocks and in the walls of their peaks. It is out of the deepest depth that the highest must come to its height.

(ASZ)

Free from what? As if that mattered to Zarathustra!

But your eyes should tell me brightly: free for what?

(ASZ)

What is it: is man only a blunder of God, or God only a blunder of man?

(G-D)

Two great European narcotics, alcohol and Christianity.

(G-D)

Some are born posthumously.

(DA)

In Christianity neither morality nor religion come into contact with reality at any point.

(DA)

The very word "Christianity" is a misunderstanding — in truth, there was only one Christian, and he died on the cross.

(DA)

It is I, the ungodly Zarathustra, who saith: 'Who is ungodlier than I,

that I may enjoy his teaching?'"--

(ASZ)

What! Hardly have I escaped from that magician, and must another

necromancer[the last pope] again run across my path,--

(ASZ)

Thus spoke the devil to me once: 'Even God has his hell: it is his love for man.'

And lately I heard him say this word: "God is dead: of his pity for man hath God died."

(ASZ)

And mankind reckons time from the dies nefastus when this fatality befell--from the first day of Christianity!

--Why not rather from its last?--From today?--The transvaluation of all values! . . .

(DA)

(...) Aan de andere kant: is men eenmaal met zijn schip hier verzeild geraakt, nu welaan! Nu stevig de tanden op elkaar; de ogen open, de hand vast aan het roer! - we zeilen rechtsreeks over de moraal heen, we pletten, verbrijzelen misschien ons eigen restant van zedelijkheid doordat we daarheen durven varen – maar wat doen wij ertoe! (...)

(JSGUB, §23)

The ideas of the herd should rule in the herd – but not reach beyond it.

(WZM, §287)

What has become of the last trace of decent feeling, of self-respect, when our statesmen, otherwise an unconventional class of men and thoroughly anti-Christian in their acts, now call themselves Christians and go to the communion table? . . . A prince at the head of his armies, magnificent as the expression of the egoism and arrogance of his people--and yet acknowledging, without any shame, that he is a Christian! . . . Whom, then, does Christianity deny? what does it call "the world"? To be a soldier, to be a judge, to be a patriot; to defend one's self; to be careful of one's honour; to desire one's own advantage; to be proud . . . every act of everyday, every instinct, every valuation that shows itself in a deed,is now anti-Christian: what a monster of falsehood the modern man must be to call himself nevertheless, and without shame, a Christian!--

(DA, §38)

And yet Christianity has to thank precisely this miserable flattery of personal vanity for its triumph--it was thus that it lured all the botched, the dissatisfied, the fallen upon evil days, the whole refuse and off-scouring of humanity to its side. The "salvation of the soul"--in plain English: "the world revolves around me." . . .

(DA, §43)

A New Precaution. Let us no longer think so much about punishing, blaming, and improving! We shall seldom be able to alter an individual, and if we should succeed in doing so, something else may also succeed, perhaps unawares: we may have been altered by him! Let us rather see to it that our own influence on all that is to come outweighs and overweighs his influence! Let us not struggle in direct conflict!all blaming, punishing, and desire to improve comes under this category. But let us elevate ours elves all the higher! Let us ever give to our pattern more shining colors! Let us obscure the other by our light! No! We do not mean to become darker ourselves on his account, like those who punish and are discontented! Let us rather go aside! Let us look away!

(DFW, §321)

I wander among men as I wander among fragments and limbs of human beings. That is what is so dreadful in my eyes, that I find men scattered and in ruins as on a battlefield, or a butcherfield. And if my eye flees from the present to the past, it always finds the same things: terrible accidents, but no human beings.

(ASZ)

- Leggerezza e pesantezza -

(2)

Se ogni secondo della vostra vita si ripete un numero infinito di volte, siamo inchiodati all'eternità come Gesù Cristo sulla croce. E' un'idea terribile. Nel mondo dell'eterno ritorno, su ogni gesto grava il peso di una insostenibile responsabilità. Ecco perchè Nietzsche chiamava l'idea dell'eterno ritorno il fardello più pesante (das schwerste Gewicht). Se l'eterno ritorno è il fardello più pesante, allora le nostre vite su questo sfondo possono apparire in tutta la loro meravigliosa leggerezza. Ma davvero la pesantezza è terribile e la leggerezza meravigliosa? Il fardello più pesante ci opprime, ci piega, ci schiaccia al suolo. Ma nella poesia d'amore di tutti i tempi la donna desidera essere gravata dal fardello del corpo dell'uomo. Il fardello più pesante è quindi allo stesso tempo l'immagine del più intenso compimento vitale. Quanto più il fardello è pesante, tanto più la nostra vita è vicina alla terra, tanto più è reale e autentica.

Al contrario, l'assenza assoluta di un fardello fa sì che l'uomo diventi più leggero dell'aria, prenda il volo verso l'alto, si allontani dalla terra, dall'essere terreno, diventi solo a metà reale e i suoi movimenti siano tanto liberi quanto privi di significato. Che cosa dobbiamo scegliere, allora? La pesantezza o la leggerezza? Questa domanda se l'era posta Parmenide nel sesto secolo avanti cristo. Egli vedeva l'intero universo diviso in coppie di opposizioni: luce-buio, spesso-sottile, caldo-freddo, essere-non-essere. Uno dei poli dell'opposizione era per lui positivo (la luce, il caldo, il sottile, l'essere), l'altro negativo.
Questa suddivisione in un polo positivo e in uno negativo può apparirci di una semplicità puerile. Salvo in un caso: che cos'è positivo, la pesantezza o la leggerezza? Parmenide rispose: il leggero è positivo, il pesante è negativo. Aveva ragione oppure no? Questo è il problema. Una sola cosa è certa: l'opposizione pesante-leggero è la più misteriosa e la più ambigua tra tutte le opposizioni.

(9)

Tutte le lingue che derivano dal latino formano la parola compassione col prefisso "com-" e la radice passio che significa originariamente "sofferenza". In altre lingue, ad esempio in ceco, in polacco, in tedesco, in svedese, questa parola viene tradotta con un sostantivo composto da un prefisso con lo stesso significato seguito dalla parola "sentimento" (in ceco: soucit; in polacco: wspol-czucie; in tedesco: Mit-gefuhl; in svedese: med-kansla).
Nelle lingue derivate dal latino, la parola compassione significa: non possiamo guardare con indifferenza le sofferenze altrui; oppure: partecepiamo al dolore di chi soffre. Un'altra parola dal significato quasi identico, pietà (in inglese pity, francese pitiè, ecc) suggerisce persino una sorta di indulgenza verso colui che soffre. Aver pietà di una donna significa che siamo superiori a quella donna, che ci chiniamo, ci abbassiamo al suo livello.
E' per questo che la parola compassione generalmente ispira diffidenza; designa un sentimento ritenuto mediocre, di second'ordine, che che non ha molto a che vedere con l'amore. Amare qualcuno per compassione significa non amarlo veramente.
Nelle lingue che formano la parola compassione non dalla radice "sofferenza" (passio) bensì dal sostantivo "sentimento", la parola viene usata con un significato quasi identico, ma non si può dire che indichi un sentimento cattivo o mediocre. La forza nascosta della sua etimologia bagna la parola di una luce diversa e le dà un senso più ampio: avere compassione (co-sentimento) significa vivere insieme a lui qualsiasi altro sentimento: gioai, angoscia, felicità, dolore. Questa compassione (nel senso di soucit, wspòlczucie, Mit-gefuhl, medkansla) designa quindi la capacità massima di immaginazione affettiva, l'arte della telepatia delle emozioni. Nella gerarchia dei sentimenti è il sentimento supremo.[...]

(16)

A differenza di Parmenide, per Beethoven la pesantezza era a quanto pare qualcosa di positivo.
"Der schwer gefasste Entschluss" la grave soluzione, è unita con la voce del Destino (Es muss sein!"); la pesantezza, la necessità e il valore sono tre concetti intimamente legati fra loro: solo ciò che è necessario è pesante, solo ciò che pesa ha valore. Questa convinzione è nata dalla musica di Beethoven e, benchè sia possibile (per non dire probabile) che la responsabilità di essa ricada più sugli esegeti di Beethoven che sul compositore stesso, oggi la condividiamo più o meno tutti: la grandezza di un uomo risiede per noi nel fatto che egli porta il suo destino come Atlante portava sulle spalle la volta celeste.
L'eroe beethoviano è un sollevatore di pesi metafisici.[...]

- L'anima e il corpo -

(28)

Sedeva schiacciata in un angolo dello scompartimento, la pesante valigia sopra la testa, Karenin tutto raggomitolato contro le gambe. Stava pensando al cuoco del ristorante dove lavorava quando viveva dalla madre. Approfittava di ogni occasione per darle una pacca sul sedere e molte volte davanti a tutti le aveva proposto di andare a letto con lui. Era strano che pensasse proprio a lui, ora. Per lei il cuoco rappresentava l'esempio tipico di tutto ciò che le ripugnava. Adesso però non pensava che a trovarelo e dirgli: "Dicevi di voler venire a letto con me. Ebbene, eccomi"
Desiderava fare qualcosa che non lasciasse possibilità di ritorno. Desiderava distruggere brutalmente tutto il passato dei suoi ultimi sette anni. Era la vertigine. L'ottenebrante, irresistibile desiderio di cadere.
La vertigine potremmo anche chiamarla ebbrezza della debolezza. Ci si rende conto della propria debolezza e invece di resisterle, ci si vuole abbandonare a essa. Ci si ubriaca della propria debolezza, si vuole essere ancor più deboli, si vuole cadere in mezzo alla strada, davanti a tutti, si vuole stare in basso, ancora più in basso.

- Le parole fraintese -

(3)

Piccolo dizionario di parole fraintese.
DONNA. Essere donna è per Sabina un destino che lei non si è scelta. Ciò che non abbiamo scelto non possiamo considerarlo nè un nostro merito nè un nostro fallimento. Sabina pensa che sia necessario tenere un atteggiamento corretto nei confronti del destino che le è stato assegnato. Ribellarsi contro il fatto di essere nata donna le sembra altrettanto sciocco che farsene un vanto.
Una volta, durante uno dei loro primi incontri, Franz le aveva detto, con una sottolineatura curiosa: "Sabina, lei è una donna". Lei non capiva perchè lui le desse questo annuncio con la solennità di un Cristoforo Colombo che ha appena avvistato la costa dell'America. Solo più tardi aveva capito che la parola donna, che lui aveva pronunciato con un'enfasi particolare, non designava per lui uno dei due sessi della specie umana, ma rappresentava un valore. Non tutte le donne erano degne di essere chiamte donne.

FEDELTÁ E TRADIMENTO Il tradimento. Fin da piccoli il papà e il maestro ci dicono che è la cosa peggiore che si possa immaginare. Ma che cos'è questo tradire? Tradire significa uscire fuori dai ranghi. Tradire significa uscire dai ranghi e partire verso l'ignoto. Sabina non conosceva niente di più bello che partire verso l'ignoto.[...]
Fu nuovamente assalita dal desiderio di tradire: tradire il proprio tradimento Annunciò al marito (non vedeva più in lui la testa calda, ma solo un fastidioso ubriaco) che lo avrebbe lasciato. Ma se tradiamo B, per il quale abbiamo tradito A, non ne deriva necessariamente che ci riconcilieremo con A. La vita della pittrice divorziata non somigliava alla vita dei genitori traditi. Il primo tradimento è irreparabile. Esso provoca una reazione a catena di nuovi tradimenti, ciascuno dei quali ci allontana sempre più dal punto del tradimento originario.

I was never indoctrinated into a faith, so it comes as no surprise that I, even at a very young age, have always understood the absurdity of organized religion. Living my entire life as an atheist also led me down a path of nihilism. This isn’t the dreary jet black path that so many people make it out to be. Heck, it’s not even a path really. It is more or less an innate and fundamental understanding that the only absolute value that a concept, being, or object has is the value that the assignee grants to it. You don’t have to be very intelligent to come across this conclusion, you just have to be somewhat pragmatic, strong-willed, and have had the good fortune of never being initiated into some sort of religious thought control; because then it becomes much harder to “break” through the inconsistencies of your non-logical paradigm.

That being said one fateful evening my somewhat shallow and pseudo-nihilistic world view came to a climax. Without getting into the boring technicalities I had an awakening of sorts; albeit this awakening did not pull me away from my nihilistic tendencies -it did however illuminate an entirely new concept that I had previously never fathomed. You see, words are merely abstractions that inadequately attempt to explain experience. Yeah, you can read about a fiery romance, but unless you’ve ever actually experienced the wrath of love, then you can never fully understand the pleasant (or terrifying) delusions of such an emotion. The same can be said for ego-loss, or loss of self.

At first it was terrifying. Every last strand of my being was attempting to pull itself back together- to assimilate as one again. But it was no use. The self I had known was gone. All that was left were hollow details. It was like reading the biography of a long deceased friend. I was then thrust into an abyss of sorts - a dazzling “bottomless pit” where everything really is everything and the individual goes to perish. It is here that you became me, and I became you. It was so surreal that it became cinematic. It was so cinematic that it became surreal. It was beauty defined. And then, it was over. I was myself again – now the only thing that’s left nearly two years later is a reminder of the day I went to pieces without falling apart.

Before that realization I took an astronomy class in college that was taught in a fairly large planetarium. Each day upon leaving the class I’d gaze up into the sky with the understanding that I was an ant... no I was smaller; I was a grain of sand lost in the vastness of an infinite universe. I am now aware that “I” was wrong. I am not a grain of sand. I’m merely the reflection of an idea. I am nothing… and yet… I am everything. I bet this whole thing sounds absurd. Don’t worry, it is.

L'enfant est le père de l'homme.

französische Redensart

Infantil nennen wir das zur Schau gestellte Bedürfnis. Dabei können die Kinder gar nichts dafür.

Als der Mann aus seiner häuslichen Botmäßigkeit in die Öffentlichkeit floh und zum Weltbürger erwuchs, hat er Weib und Kinder als Unerwachsene zurückgelassen. Und so, wie es sich bei dem substantivierten Partizip ‚der Erwachsene’ deutlich hörbar um eine verlegene Spätschöpfung handelt, ist auch das Kind ein semantischer Neuerwerb. Ursprünglich bezeichnet daz kint ein Verwandtschaftsverhältnis, nämlich Söhne und Töchter, unabhängig vom Alter. In Wolframs Parzival kann dann jeder Jüngere gegenüber jedem Älteren als kint erscheinen - ein Genera- tionenverhältnis. Als Angehö- riger eines definierten gesell- schaftlichen Standes ist das Kind allerdings eine Kreation der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Denn weil die Frau ihre öffentliche Anerkennung schließlich durch Arbeit rechtfertigen konnte, bleibt das Kind in seiner Uner- wachsenheit alleine übrig. Und jetzt sieht es so aus, als bilde es den bestimmten (bedürftigen) Gegensatz zur Erwachsenheit. Es ist aber kein Gegensatz, sondern ein Residuum. Als solches steht es nicht nur dem gemeinsamen Ursprung, sondern ironischerweise auch der gemeinsamen Zukunft näher als manche andern.

Ernsthafte Leute halten das Kindliche nämlich für die wahre Bestimmung des Menschen. „Neotenie“: so heißt die These, wonach sich der Evolutionsprozeß von Homo sapiens dadurch auszeichnet, daß er im Lauf der Generationen zu solchen Gestaltformen zurückkehrt, die im Tierreich die spezifisch kindlichen waren. Die auffälligsten (aber nicht einzigen) Kennzeichen dieser „ewigen Unreife des Menschen“, wie sie Leszek Kolakowski nennt und die der Beitrag seines männlichen Anteils ist, sind die relative Übergröße des Kopfes, der Verlust des Haarkleids und die Überlänge der Gliedmaßen bei verkürztem Rumpf.

Doch wäre das Morphologische alles - es wäre nur ein naturgeschichtliches Kuriosum. Ihren Sinn erhält die Kindlichkeit unserer Körperformen aber durch unsere spezifisch kindliche Zugewandtheit zur Welt: die Neugier. „Nur der Mensch behält - neben den körperlichen Merkmalen der Jugendlichkeit - auch die kindliche Neugier bis ins hohe Alter. Unsere permanente Wißbegier ist ein persistierendes Jugendmerkmal, unser exploratives Forschen ist dem Spiel des Kindes verwandt“, sagt Konrad Lorenz. „Dieses Kind im Manne ist ein echter Lausbub. In der Brust des normalen Erwachsenen leben zwei Seelen, eine, die den hergebrachten Traditionen treu ist, und daneben die Seele des Revolutionärs.“

Und daß der Volksmund das Kind im Manne ansiedelt und nicht in der Frau, hat einen offenbaren guten Sinn. Mutwille, Vergeudung von Material und Lebenskraft, Unrast und Ungeduld, ewiges Streben nach Lob und Anerkennung, Größentraum und der Blick in die Sterne - kaum ein Merkmal des spezifisch Kindlichen, das sich nicht auch als „typisch Mann“ verlästern ließe. Ein rein humaner Neuerwerb ist die charakteristische Nähe der Männlichkeit zum Kindlichen übrigens nicht. Sie ist in der Naturgeschichte vorgezeichnet. Quer durch die Tierwelt, mindestens jedoch bei den Säugern, scheint das Leis- tungsschema der weiblichen Orga- nismen auf eine konstante, durch- schnittliche Dauer- belastung angelegt zu sein, ohne dabei den kriti- schen Punkt zu erreichen. Dagegen strebt das männliche Individuum, wie es scheint, immer wieder bis an die Leistungsgrenze, aber „von Natur“ fehlt ihm die Ausdauer; er braucht Muße. Und das ist ein spezifisch kindlicher Zug - nämlich das energetische Prinzip eines Organismus, der noch wächst. Womöglich sind also Neotenie und Selbstbehauptung des Männlichen in der Gattungsgeschichte von Homo sapiens zwei Seiten desselben Vorgangs (und man verstünde, wie Michael Jackson zum Größten Star Aller Zeiten werden konnte).[1]

„Zweierlei will der echte Mann: Gefahr und Spiel“, heißt es in den Reden Zarathustras. „Besser als ein Mann versteht das Weib die Kinder“, geht es zwar weiter, und nach nichts ringt (sagt Schiller) die weibliche Gefallsucht so sehr wie nach dem Schein des Kindlichen - von wegen der reinen Bedürftigkeit. „Aber der Mann ist kindlicher als das Weib. Im echten Manne ist ein Kind versteckt, das will spielen.“ Denn das Kind ist eben keine reine Bedürftigkeit: Es will ja auch Gefahr und Spiel. Körperkraft und biologische Fruchtbarkeit teilt es wohl nicht mit den Männern - aber dieses, worauf es viel mehr ankommt: das bestimmte Gefühl, daß etwas fehlt. „Ich bin, was ich bin“ ist so unkindlich wie unmännlich. Denn es gibt Eines, was das Kind auf jeden Fall will: größer sein. L'enfant est le père de l'homme - der des Menschen sowieso, und der des Mannes erst recht.

Ein Mann kann nicht wieder zum Kind

werden, oder er wird kindisch. Aber muß er

nicht selbst wieder auf einer höheren Stufe

bestrebt sein, seine Wahrheit zu reproduzieren?

Marx

Natürlich sind nicht Frauen so und Männer so. Sondern manche Neigungen wurden durch das Spiel von Auslese und Anpassung unter den Geschlechtern ungleichmäßig verteilt. Es ist keine Sache von entweder-oder, sondern von mehr oder weniger, und auch das nur im breiten Durchschnitt. Was im einzelnen zutrifft, muß sich im einzelnen erweisen. Wieviel daran Natur ist und wieviel bloß Kultur, ist interessant, aber nicht wichtig, denn über Wert und Unwert sagt es nichts. Allerdings gibt es historische Momente, da sind gewisse Neigungen mehr gefragt als andere.

Der aktuelle Moment ist die Ablösung der Wirtschafts- und Arbeitsgesellschaft durch... was? Immerhin ist es, nach dem aufrechten Gang und der Erfindung der Arbeit, unser dritter großer Sprung. Da wird es noch einige Generationen brauchen, bis sich die Konturen des Werdenden abzeichnen. Es ist aber das erstemal, daß wir in vollem Bewußtsein springen. Darum wissen wir immerhin, was nicht wieder werden wird: ein Reich von Kreislauf und Gleichgewicht. Es wird eine Zeit der Umbrüche. Und dafür wird das Genügen am eignen Hiersein und seinen Notdürften weniger taugen als der Mutwille mit dem eingewachsenen Stachel, daß er seine Werke rechtfertigen muß.

Ob auch die neue Welt aus sich heraus eine ‚Substanz’ generiert, die sich zum ‚Maß’ ihrer Werte eignet, steht in den Sternen. Die Emergenz neuer Werte ist gar nicht abzusehen, aber die alten verfallen. Was in der Zwischenzeit immer Geltung beansprucht, wird sich foro publico selber rechtfertigen müssen, jedes auf eigne Faust. Anders gesagt, an die Stelle der unter der Verkleidung von ‚ökonomischer Notwendig- keit’ um Befriedigung wett- eifernden Notdurften treten politische Entscheidungen im eminenten Sinn. Ob sich die weltliche Öffentlichkeit von der viralen Infektion durch nischige Privatismen reinigen kann, wird dabei zur Exis- tenzfrage. Das postmoderne Bedürfnisbefriedigungs- und Selbstverwirk-lichungsyndrom ist das Caput mortuum einer schon verflossenen Zeit. Freiwillig wird es nicht abtreten. So wird es nötig, im öffentlichen Raum eine Zulassungsordnung einzurichten: Öffentliches Auftreten läßt sich nur rechtfertigen durch die Abenteuer des Selberdenkens und den Stolz, für seine Resultate gradezustehn - immer eingedenk, daß noch was fehlt. Es ist eine Bildungsaufgabe; die Bildungsaufgabe. Da trifft es sich gut, daß unsre Spezies darauf nicht erst wieder durch einen jahrtausendelangen Domestikationsprozeß schmerzhaft zugerichtet werden muß. Die Neigung dazu ist ihr doppelt gattungsgeschichtlich eingepflanzt, indem wir unter allen Lebensformen nicht nur die männlichste, sondern eben auch die kindlichste sind. Sie muß nur freigesetzt werden.

A Nascente

Ayn Rand

ISBN:  8577750604

"'A nascente' é um romance sobre um herói - e sobre aqueles que o invejam e tentam destruí-lo. A obra de Ayn Rand narra a história da luta do arquiteto Howard Roark, cuja integridade era imóvel como o granito, e de Dominique Francon, a deslumbrante mulher que amava Roark, mas se casou com seu pior inimigo. Rand apresenta uma idéia desafiadora - a de que o ego do homem é a nascente do progresso humano."

Um livro para se ler em conjunto com o "Zaratustra" do profeta de Basiléia, e para aqueles que não são "humanos, demasiado humanos"!

Suite à de premières considérations épistémologiques concernant la psychanalyse, il est à présent temps de réfléchir aux rapports de la psychanalyse et de la science. Où se situe la première par rapport à la seconde ? Quel est le lieu de l'ascience (comme science de l'objet a) par rapport à la science ?
 
Acceptons ce qui tient lieu de critère de scientificité, à savoir la réfutabilité des énoncés et théories. Pour Karl Popper, un énoncé ou une théorie est scientifique à condition que nous soyons en mesure de proposer un énoncé qui, s'il se vérifiait, réfuterait la théorie. Ainsi, la proposition A : "le soleil se lève toujours à l'Est" est un énoncé scientifique puisque je peux proposer un autre énoncé qui le réfuterait, B : "le soleil se lève au Nord, au Sud ou à l'Ouest" (il suffit que B soit validé empiriquement, au moins une fois, pour que A soit invalidé). De même, la proposition C : "le soleil se lève au Sud" est également un énoncé réfutable, et est de fait scientifique. En revanche, les propositions "Dieu existe" et "Dieu n'existe pas" ne peuvent prétendre à la scientificité. Effectivement, il est impossible ni de vérifier, ni de réfuter ces énoncés ; on ne peut proposer l'observation d'un phénomène qui, s'il survenait, viendrait réfuter l'un ou l'autre de ces énoncés.

Tentons un parallèle, espérons-le, le moins hasardeux possible. La notion popperienne de réfutabilité ne renvoie-t-elle pas à une dimension symbolique de l'énoncé scientifique ? Il s'agit en effet pour un énoncé scientifique qu'il inclue en lui (en son revers) la possibilité de son dépassement par réfutation, c'est-à-dire que son objectivité se soutient de ce que sa dénégation (Verneinung) lui est contingente. Ainsi, la proposition d'Estienne Tabourot (1547-1590) : "toutes les jeunes filles doutent de leur foi" est scientifique car propose implicitement sa réfutation objective et manifeste (il suffit de trouver une jeune fille qui ne douterait pas de sa foi pour réfuter la théorie). Cependant, toujours dans le lieu des contingences de cette proposition, il existe une trahison de l'ordre d'une réfutation subjective et latente. Cette singulière dénégation, non-popperienne, consisterait en une réfutation sur le mode de l'équivoque antistrophique... de la contrepèterie. Ainsi, la proposition de Tabourot accepte deux niveaux de réfutation : 1°) objective et manifeste (popperienne), "au moins une jeune fille ne doute pas de sa foi" ; 2°) subjective et latente (...freudienne ?), "toutes les jeunes filles foutent de leurs doigts".

Ce deuxième niveau de réfutation latente renvoie au fait que le langage humain est un langage symbolique. La communication y est donc éminemment sujette à l'équivoque, à la mésentente, un irréductible terrain de qui pro quo. Non seulement, il est possible (pour ne pas dire probable !) qu'on comprenne mal lorsque je dis qu'un facteur est arrivé à pied par la Chine, mais encore, il est possible que je mente ou que je me trompe. D'où nous notons que pour faire science, il paraît nécessaire de réduire l'ambiguïté inhérente au langage : le langage formel est donc l'outil dont se dote une science afin de se débarasser de l'excès de sens qu'implique les propositions formulées en langage naturel.

En revanche, une discipline qui se donne pour objet d'étude la dimension symbolique du langage, du rêve, de l'art, de la religion... se heurte nécessairement à l'irréductible interprétabilité, au surplus de sens, à la subjectivité (tant de l'objet d'étude, que du chercheur lui-même). L'herméneutique freudienne selon Paul Ricoeur coinciderait bien avec telle conception particulière de la science : une science du symbolique. Notons que, bien que se soustrayant à la réfutabilité popperienne, ce projet d'une science qui se donnerait pour objet d'étude le second niveau de réfutation (subjective) ne s'en dote pas moins d'un appareil logique rigoureux hypothético-déductif.

Reprenons. D'un côté, la science se soutient de ce qu'elle produit des énoncés objectivement réfutables. De l'autre, la psychanalyse, loin de pouvoir en dire autant, s'articule autour du point où le sujet (son "objet d'étude") se réfute lui-même singulièrement et subjectivement (et, corollairement, de façon non-généralisable). A présent, nous pouvons émettre la proposition selon laquelle la psychanalyse tenterait la production de théories de l'inthéorisable (et non pas de l'inthéorisé ainsi que le vise la science). Quant aux dynamiques respectives de la science et de la psychanalyse : la réfutation est pour la première le moteur de son progrès (l'irréfutabilité conduit à une stagnation dogmatique) ; la Verneinung est pour la seconde le moment où apparaît l'objet de la psychanalyse et où elle commence à se mettre en branle (la "non-dénégationnabilité" n'est pas envisageable car il semble bien que l'homme soit toujours en position de se trahir lui-même : pour employer un terme nietzschéen, le Surhomme est toujours donné comme possible).

Ah oui, j’oubliais, l’avant propos se termine « Lausanne juillet 1998 »… n’est-ce point là la ville, oui la ville qui héberge des blogs, dont le syndic (un certain Braît-là, Belan, Brailan, mais pas d’as) à dit une fois, si mes souvenirs sont bons « ce sont les Suisses qui ne sortent pas la nuit qui souffrent d’un sentiment d’insécurité » (quelqu’un dispose peut être d’un recueil des déclarations intempestives de ce manant ?)… Voilà une preuve de du jeu de l’ « ethnisation » d’un phénomène ! Ce sont les Suisses seuls qui…. Un soir de l’intérieur de mon Fokker, planant au-desus de cette cité, j’ai surpris une conversation entre « immigrés » qui parlaient de leur inquiétude lorsque leurs ados sortaient… Mais seuls les… « »

Les causes et nécessité pour la classe dominante et comment les forces qui devraient la combattre aident DE FAIT à pérenniser sa domination, du phénomène « Caviar (pour les uns), guerre totale et civile (pour tous les autres) » pour une prochaine fois, si d’ici làààààààà… (c’est le ton pour la note)
Je décide de voler sur le dos, histoire que le sang, entre autre me monte à la tête, si, si !

*voir tintin « l’étoile mystérieuse »

Ich denke auf die meisten Menschen trifft dies nicht zu. Jene, welche an Stresserkrankungen leiden, die sich durch das Leben hetzen, möglichst viel erreichen wollen, sich nicht einmal Fragen wozu überhaupt und in der wenigen Zeit, die sie für sich haben, lassen sie sich berauschen oder berieseln. Arbeit, Rausch und Berieselung sind oft die einzigen Dinge, mit denen sie sich beschäftigen.

All jene, deren geistige Kapazitäten für wirklich überlegte Erkenntnisse ausreichen würden, haben das Angebot, mehr noch sogar den sozialen Druck, ihre Fähigkeiten in Dinge zu investieren, die eher finanziell als ideell Gewinn bringend sind. Überall wird einem erzählt oder vorgelebt, wie weit man es bringen kann. Diejenigen, die es können, eifern diesen fremden Zielen nach und so wird denen, mit Geist im Überfluss, die Zeit knapp.

Es gibt auch solche mit genügend Zeit, die von der Gesellschaft allerdings sehr negativ sanktioniert werden, weshalb diejenigen, die eine Möglichkeit dazu haben, versuchen nicht zu denen mit genügend Zeit zu gehören. Menschen, die beschließen wenig zu arbeiten, gelten in der Regel als faul und solche, die gar nicht arbeiten als Sozialschmarotzer. Da man die Intelligenz beschäftigt hält, findet man in dieser Schicht tatsächlich oft eher ungebildete Menschen – sie haben also die Zeit, aber keinen Geist im Überfluss.

Es gibt wahrscheinlich nur wenige, die sich mit den Problemen, um sie herum wirklich effektiv auseinander setzen und Lösungen finden können. Solche mit genügend Zeit und Geist im Überfluss. Ob das wohl reicht, um die Progression der Menschheit aufrecht zu erhalten? Und welche Frage dir gerade wichtiger sein sollte: Wozu willst du gehören?

*Nietzsche, Der Antichrist, Kapitel 49

Baseado no romance de estréia de Irvin Yalom, o filme com mesmo título, conta a história de um encontro fictício entre o filósofo alemão Friedrich Nietzsche e o Médico Josef Breuer, professor de Sigmund Freud.

Esse encontro se dá graças à insistência perssuasiva de Lou Salomé (Katheryn Winnick) que foi a grande paixão e obsessão de Nietzsche (Armand Assante). Ela pede que o Dr. Breuer (Ben Cross) o trate com a controversa técnica da "terapia através da fala".

Quando o Médico se vê diante do filósofo, percebe a inteligência e brilhantismo de seu suposto paciente, e impressionado resolve então propor um tratamento de duas vias. Ele trata Nietzsche enquanto este trata dele mesmo, pois o próprio médico também está sofrendo pela paixão por sua paciente chamada Anna O. (O Caso de Histeria). O Dr. Breuer tem ainda o auxílio do seu pupilo Dr. Freud (Jamie Elman).

O resultado é um filme maravilhoso, que mistura filosofia e psicologia, obsessões, medos, e sonhos. De quebra ainda temos a trilha sonora com muita música clássica, com Wagner, Tchaikovsky, Bizet.

A cena inesquecível é quando Nietzsche rege, já delirante, uma Orquestra que toca As Valquírias, de seu não mais amigo, Richard Wagner.

Não li o livro mas os comentários dizem ser um romance excelente. Taí uma boa pedida: o filme, o livro ou ambos. A única opção ruim seria não mergulhar nesse romance inteligente.

Por: Thaís Gischkow.

Quando Nietzsche Chorou (When Nietzsche Wept). 2006. EUA. Direção e Roteiro: Pinchas Perry. Elenco: Armand Assante, Katheryn Winnick, Ben Cross, Jamie Elman, Andreas Beckett (Zarathustra), Ayana Haviv (Singer - 'Hymnus an den leben'), Rachel O'Meara (Frau Becker), Joanna Pacula (Mathilda), Michal Yannai (Bertha). Gênero: Drama, Romance. Duração: 105 minutos.

With his unrelenting critique of the status quo, view from the outside, and precocious insights, Karl Marx was truly a (social) thinker ahead of his time—the model, I argue, that later thinkers like Foucault and Deleuze—whether consciously or unconsciously—reckoned with (as opposed to looked up to) as a model. This is not to say that Foucault and Deleuze share all of Marx’s dispositions (as if they came from similar backgrounds) or that they accept wholesale his thought (as though they considered themselves to be continuing the work of Marx). But both Foucault and Deleuze, I think, learned considerably from Marx’s style of “philosophy” from the outside (rooted on the social position that Marx occupied), took to heart his “goal” (a more harmonious social collective), even though they tinkered and in some instances extended the patterns of his thought (i.e. his philosophical frameworks/system and its relation to politics and the social) and even rejected some of his concepts.  This, we may say, is a “complex relation.”

For explanatory purposes, this complex relation can be divided into two kinds: the first has to do with methodology and the second with content. Methodologically speaking, Foucault and Deleuze have affinities (and differences) with Marx in terms of the “kind” of philosophy they practice, their influences, and their strategy. Foucault and Deleuze practice what can be described as a “politicized” philosophy. Not just political (i.e. that which has to do with matters of politics), but politicized (that which has a presupposed political commitment that serves, especially with Deleuze, as a starting point and which determines what the resulting philosophy looks like). Marx was concerned with political struggle; specifically, with the struggle that will bring the “proletarian class,” the class in which he (ideologically and personally/historically) belonged, to its inevitable triumph. True, he was influenced by Hegel in delineating a “progressive movement” to history (making it material in making the struggle/quest not one of spiritual/intellectual discovery but of economic forces). True, it can be said that assigning inevitable victory to the working class can be accounted for (in a deterministic way) by their numbers (and previous patterns in history). But Marx’s very focus on the working class and assignation of final victory to them (in a battle whose outcome cannot really be predicted) is not an objectively philosophical claim (at least not merely), but a political one. This in two senses: because it is based on his own political position as part of that class and to induce a political effect (to rouse the working class and transform them into the universal “proletarian). Another example with a somewhat tamer implication is Marx’s critiques of treatises of political economy. Marx, unlike the practitioners of political economy (like Ricardo), does not read political economy from the viewpoint of capital (e.g. does not focus on how profits are going to increase even more in the next cycle). In fact, the very strength and precocity of his work (like Capital) relies on the fact that he questioned the thinking with respect to the economic system as delineated from capital’s viewpoint and showed it to be historically specific—precisely by looking at it through his own outsider viewpoint, i.e. as part of the working class.

(Just to clarify: This above paragraph does not mean that Marx cared only for the working class (because that was precisely the class of which he is part), that he forwarded only their interest. What Marx was ultimately aiming for is what can be referred to as a harmonious social collective in which man can remain in touch with his “being,” in which s/he does what s/he wants, feels inclined to, has a talent for at the same time that he is sufficiently remunerated in order to survive in the social structure in which s/he belongs. Perhaps it is then better to say that what betrays the politicization of Marx’s philosophy is the fact that he saw this happening through the working class in its transformation as the proletarian. The proletarian is a universal class, one that includes everyone—but the working class has a unique role to play in it. That privileging and the fact that he sees the injustice that the working class is going through (a fact he wouldn’t see otherwise, if he were for example a capitalist) is, it can be argued, what motivates his philosophy and gives it its unique character. Thus even as it includes everyone (to an ideal egalitarian state), Marx’s philosophy and its goals are politicized.)

Foucault and Deleuze do not come from the same class background as Marx—but their works are as equally politicized in (esp. in the case of Foucault) assuming that the political is (already) mixed in their work (and its effects) and (in the case of Deleuze) in taking a particular political viewpoint/stance. The first part of the preceding assumption is precisely the point that Foucault makes in his epistemologies and genealogies, as well as essays that theoretically define power and power/knowledge. In The Order of Things, Foucault speaks of epistemes (roughly, ways of seeing/viewing the world) that change as sociohistorical conditions change (which is a political change). Foucault talks about the changing structures of power (different “regimes of power,” different ways in which it works, i.e. different ways in which one is made to do something and makes another do something) (focusing on disciplinary power) in Discipline and Punish. In these works, an important point made is the fact that the way that things are (whether the way that we see things or the way that our relations and society—i.e. the social—is managed or controlled) is an inherently political fact. Foucault also develops the concept of power/knowledge, in which is implied the intricate relations between the two in which they are virtually inseparable. We can say that in Foucault the political is power and the fact that all relationships on whatever level (between two people, between a person and a thing, the ruler and the citizen) involve power. Unlike Marx, he does not necessarily take a particular viewpoint to forward that, but he does recognize the “pervasiveness” of the political. This is the way in which we can say that Foucault extends Marx’s concept of power and studies all such relations and not just that between the worker and the capitalist (without taking the viewpoint of one or the other). Foucault’s philosophy of power can thus be looked at as grounding the political struggles that Marx talked about with an “abstract” general theoretical basis.

Deleuze, esp. in his works with Guattari, unabashedly takes a political viewpoint—what can be referred to as an anti-Oedipal one—and, through his “philosophy” (itself shaped by it), promotes it polemically. His philosophy works in two ways then: it forwards his political positions at the same time that his philosophy is constructed based on his political positions. The position is anti-Oedipal: anti-establishment, anti-totalization, anti-humanist, revolutionary; and the (virtual) concepts and frameworks thus constructed (the body-without-organs, the State as the apparatus of capture, the war machine, (de)coding, (de)territorialization, language as a regime of signs) are meant to make this position work in actuality. The philosophy comes out of and is directed against (certain parts of) the sociohistorical situation in which it is in, namely capitalism (shored up by Royal science, such as psychoanalysis). It is thus, as in Marx, socially aware and attempts to be socially affective based on the particular political commitment it comes out of (namely, post-May 1968 politics).

Politicized philosophy, then: philosophies socially aware (with the claim that the social is political, saturated in power relations) and (given the particular political commitment in which it comes from) socially ambitious. Philosophy colored with politics. Politicized philosophy.

The two other aspects of the methodologies of the three thinkers (that have affinities and differences with each other) (i.e. influences and strategy) directly follow from this. Foucault and Deleuze are equally influenced by the historicism and the materialism that informed Marx (as is apparent in Foucault’s genealogies that vary in time and are rooted in material relations, for example, or Deleuze’s political-libidinal economy that rely on a single “energy” material rooted in the concrete social formation). More important, however, is the skill that Marx demonstrated in harmoniously intermingling these two different traditions with each other—which serves as a model for the syntheses that Foucault and Deleuze themselves accomplished. In his epistemologies (in his tracking of the different epistemes), Foucault combines materialism, Heidegger’s phenomenology, and Nietzsche’s genealogical method. Deleuze in Capitalism and Schizophrenia achieves a synthesis of Marxism and psychoanalysis (e.g. connects political and libidinal economy) through Nietzsche (by naming desire and labor as two instances of Nietzschean force) and Spinoza (fitting them in a “univocal” ontology).

Marx serves as a model for syntheses like these. By being influenced and rejecting certain parts of classical political economy, Hegelian progressivism/dialectics/historicism, and Feuerbachian materialism, he shaped a uniquely Marxist philosophy—with the purpose (true to a politicized philosophy) of forwarding his political position. In effect, Marx demonstrated the ways in which a philosopher can reject playing “take it or leave it” with any one school/tradition of thought (falling to dogmatism in that way) in order to come up with a potent philosophy able to forward political interest. This is precisely what Deleuze (with Guattari) does when he rejects certain strands of Marxism (the proletarian as universal subject), psychoanalysis (the emphasis on lack as desire), and even Nietzscheanism (the reactionary tendency to hierarchy)—while at the same time continuing and extending their “revolutionary” aspects (desire/labor as primary, the unconscious, the ontology of force rather than fixed subjects, etc.) to develop a specifically anti-Oedipal politics forwarding a political agenda which in its goal is not all that different from that of Marx.

Ultimately (i.e. after mixing and matching the different influences in the service of a political goal), Marx’s strategy is critique, i.e. to be a step remove from the society in which he belongs, see it for what it is (as an outsider), see its good and bad, its benefits and injustices, and attempt to change it (through revolutionary philosophy). Foucault’s epistemologies and genealogies (and the later technologies) make critique an essential task in pointing out that certain aspects of life we take for granted (e.g. the way that sexuality is thought about, talked about, and performed/practiced; the way that social control is administered) are historically grounded and socially specific, i.e. that they result from particular concrete sociohistorical configurations (both in space and time) and are not “natural” (i.e. just the way that things, when left to themselves, will inevitably work out; i.e. the way that God willed it). This concrete sociohistorical specificity is the same thing that motivates Deleuze in Anti-Oedipus in delineating the changing shapes of society (the primitive, the despotic, the capitalist, and the future New Earth) to explain why certain things are the way they are (and remove their mystery in that sense). A favorite target of Deleuze is Oedipus, or the concentration of desire in the family (in the object of the mother), its inevitable prohibition (by the father), and the subsequent sublimation and substitution (the asceticism in which the subject must find other object to direct his desire to, substitutes that never quite amount to the original object of desire, which inevitably makes him both submissive to and a copy of that which prohibited his desire in the first place). What Deleuze (and Guattari) point out is that Oedipus (i.e. desire in an Oedipal form) is not natural, but a result of the capitalist social system designating the family the task of making subjects (of subjectification). The mother is not the original object of desire, but is who the subject is forced to desire because he is closed up in that group (i.e. the family) (by capitalist society)—where the effect of all this is to replicate the positions of repression and oppression found in the (social) world at large (where the subject must himself be simultaneously oppressed and repressing). The point, however, is not just to point out the “unnaturalness” of things. In revealing the social specificity of the shape of desire (that Royal sciences such as psychoanalysis reinforce), i.e. in pointing out that they are a product of a particular social formation (in this example the capitalist one), Deleuze (like Marx with political economy) incites the desire to change that social formation. Critique brought to its full force.

These three aspects of the philosophical methodology of these three thinkers—its political goal, the synthesis of varied influences, and its shape as critique (of society taken as continuous with other groups such as the family)—are, in my opinion, precisely what is needed to come up with a potent philosophy able to deal with social and political issues of our (in fact, (as demonstrated by the distance that separates Marx from Foucault and Deleuze) of any) time. Marx and Foucault and Deleuze—through these three-pronged methodology—gives us a framework by which to think and work through virtually any issue—from economic inequality to imperialism, racism to gay rights. The strategy is to not be dogmatic and to learn from the various philosophical schools, to take a step back from society and take a critical stance—in order to pursue progressive political goals (in these issues). This methodology, more than any specific content of their thought, I argue, is the significant part of these philosophers’ thought, giving us the means by which to proceed, to tackle different issues of today.

It helps to be informed with the content of their thought as well, however (if only to save time and work on good and already well-established foundations). Since the division between methodology and content is artificial, I have already touched upon some contents in the previous paragraphs. What is interesting to note, however, is that while with the methodology the similarities of the different thoughts are stressed, when it comes to the content, what strikes out are the differences. I have already stressed some of the ways in which Foucault and Deleuze differ from and (in some instances) extend the thought of Marx (as in Foucault’s making more abstract Marx’s structure of power, Deleuze’s combination of libido and labor in one connected sociopolitical economy (related to this is Deleuze’s breaking down of the base and superstructure dualism by claiming that there is no ideology and that desire is part of the infrastructure), etc.). In this final part, I would like to zero in on one content of thought in which Deleuze differs from Marx and what this difference implies. (I have already done a similar thing with Marx and Foucault in the discussion of power above.)

This content is the concept of the subject. For Marx, the (universal) subject is the proletarian, a subject (not just someone coming from the working class) who does not yet know himself but through the material processes of history would discover his true identity and thereby shift from the position of a slave (politically, economically, and mentally) into that of the master. Discovery (knowledge) and identity are thus crucial components of Marxist subjectivity.

For Deleuze, the subject has no identity—or, more precisely, identity does not matter that much (because it is a mere residual effect, a reflection afterwards which does not fully account of the complexity of what/who one is). Stress is put instead on (at least in Anti-Oedipus) desiring-machines, parts that simply connect with other parts (not collected into some kind of totality, i.e. a “whole person”), and then break off (if prevented from connecting or when satiated), and then connect again—in the process consuming something, consummating a relation (with itself and with another), forming some kind of subjectivity (i.e. masculine male, masculine female, masculine female interested in a feminine male . . .) that in no way is fixed and unchangeable. That is what Deleuze claims everything is: desiring-machines: desire because that is the motivation for its actions, and machine because in all levels and in all relations, production (of connections, of subjectivities) is what takes place.

In other words, in Deleuze (more so than in Marx) the subject is not just the working class. Moreover, it is not just the “proletarian”—i.e. it is not just defined politically, economically, or mentally. It involves all aspects: the said three, but also sexuality, spiritual beliefs, even hobbies. The subject is also not a universal identical to itself (not everyone will turn into a proletarian) but rather molecular individuals different from each other. Their development is also not just a matter of a mental and political struggle—but simply one of connection, disjunction, and consummation. Lastly, it does not only involve humans but takes into account of all sorts of connections that can be made (“assemblages”). Non-totalizing, non-identical, non-universal, anti-humanist. This is the anti-Oedipal subject.

Deleuze and Foucault and Marx have similar methodologies: using diverse influences, they critique society for a political goal (the liberated and harmonious social collective). Yet in taking into account other aspects of the social (and not just the political and economic and the mental); in delineating power more abstractly (and thus preserving more of its complexity); in not requiring that its participants end up into something universal and identical; and in harnessing not just the power of the human but of all the assemblages that can be formed, Deleuze and Foucault, I believe, extend Marx to provide a more potent social thought, a more comprehensive critique, which (potentially) can lead to a more total (not just economic) revolution (the result of which, following Deleuze, in contrast to the Hegelianism in Marx, we cannot know in advance).

We would not see this if we looked at their methodologies alone. We needed to see the content of the politicization (i.e. what the political goal is), the influences they drew upon (which strands of thought), and their concepts (e.g. of power, of the subject, and how they differ) in order to come to this determination, which will then help us decide what parts of whose thought (Do we follow Marx in his concentration in the political and economic? Do we follow Deleuze in dealing with molecularities?) to import or reject to aid us as to what to do with the issues we face. Armed with this methodology (the plan of attack, as it were, the manner of proceeding) and content (conceptual tools that aid our thinking of phenomena we encounter) (some we accept, some we reject), we can then address contemporary social and political (not just economic) issues—drawing from these philosophers yet (like Foucault and Deleuze with Marx) also learning from them.

My philosophizing predates my following of Christ.  I am much less of a philosopher than I once was.  Occasionally, though, I try to do philosophy in the name and cause of Jesus.  I've been pondering a statement lately.

The statement is "God is dead"

Ordinarily, people view this as an atheistic battle cry.  But the statement is much more nuanced than that.  There's actually numerous ways people can use the term.  I thought I'd explore some of these.

The statement is associated with Frederick Nietzsche.  If he did not originate the phrase Nietzsche certainly is the one who popularized it.  And Nietzsche's own complex relationship with Christ and Christianity is something of a mirror of the phrase "God is dead."

Nietzsche is a wierd philosopher.  He's frustrating and fascinating and incredibly inconsistent.   As his philosophical career drew to a close, he became increasingly difficult to comprehend.  There's a goodly ammount of research, theorizing, and hypothesizing around the condition of his mental health toward the end of his life.

Therefore, anybody who says "Nietzsche believed X" is either over simplifying, way smarter than me, or simply wrong.  He's just not the sort of guy who lends himself to blanket statements about him.

Nonetheless, an incredibly brief but relatively accurate statement about Nietzsche is that he hated Christianity and Christians with a fierce passion... but he was fascinated by the person of Jesus. 

This is all a bit of a digression, though.  Back to his famous words: "God is dead."

On the surface, there doesn't appear to be much wiggle room.   It seems to be saying: God used to be around.  Now he's not.

One of the things that can be meant by the statement "God is dead" is that in one sense, he used to be around.   God was alive in so much as people's actions were altered by their belief in God.  But then something happened.  A cultural shift.  A scientific discovery.  We realized that there was no God after all.  In this sense, he died.

A slight modification of this meaning is the idea that God is rendered irrelevant to our every day lives.  His centrality, soverienity, etc., has been reduced.  This modification comes in two flavors.

Somebody might say "God is dead" and mean it's a good thing that we've realized that he simply isn't important. 

Or somebody might lament "God is dead" and she might mean that we have forgotten God.  This person might think that belief in God was a delusion that actually made us better people; or they might believe that our de-emphasis on God is a bad idea; we kill God in so far as we don't do what we should be doing, we don't act in the way we should be acting.

I'm not in agreement with any of these, really.  But I do think that there is something very valuable about the phrase "God is dead."  It's stated provactively, violently even.  

The bottom line about the usefulness of the phrase is this:

If it can stay dead, it was never God at all.

We have this idea in our heads.  This idea is what we think about God.  If this idea is somehow compatible with the idea of being dead, then the idea is simply not very close to the reality of God.

God is unkillable, undie-able.  Somebody might point out that the cross flies in the face of these claims.  I think this would be a fascinating and huge issue.  For now, I'll side step that issue by putting it this way:

Really, the idea seems to be that God is still dead.  The idea is that God stays dead.  Saying "God is Dead" is just a short, pithy idea.  But it loses most of it's punch if we accept the idea that death was a temporary thing for God.

No matter how you look at it, I think the value of the phrase "God is dead" works like this:

If you harbor an idea in your head, and if you think that this idea is God, you should try to imagine this entity dead.  If this idea makes sense, if you can envision your idea dead, then your engaged in ido